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 The Republic of Moldova’s Transition 
Between a Failed Communism and an 
Un-Commenced Capitalism? 
 
PETRU NEGURĂ 
 
 
 
The national emancipation movement of the late 1980s, which culminated 
in the independence of the Republic of Moldova (RM), proclaimed on August 27, 
1991, produced an effervescence of aspirations in the midst of the rising elites and 
among people “from the barricades”. These aspirations were aimed, in general, at 
creating an independent, democratic and prosperous state. According to those 
expectations and aided by Western states, Moldova would had joined the developed 
countries. It was expected to be a seamless, unambiguous, and harmonious 
transition towards democracy and market economy. The changes that took place in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
republics were seemingly supporting and confirming the inevitable and irreversible 
character of this transition to a free and prosperous society. 
In reality, the “transition”1 was felt, immediately, as a severe economic 
crisis, with effects and sequels that continued to affect a large amount of people 
until today. In the first decade of “transition”, the general standard of living 
declined to one quarter of the 1989 level2. Instead of producing the long 
expected welfare, liberal economic reforms from the period of 1990-2000 were 
associated with generalized poverty, endemic corruption and rampant inequalities. 
In this essay3, I will review the most outstanding events in the whole 
period that followed the declaration of independence in Moldova, and will try to 
                                                 
1
  The term “transition”, widely used in studies of post-Communist societies, has been 
challenged by multiple analyses. These critics target the soft and euphemistic significance 
of the term “transition” that contrasts with the much tougher reality of post-Communist 
transformation. For a discussion of the notion of “transition”, see, among others, Michael 
Burrawoy, Katherine Verdery (eds.), Uncertain Transition. Ethnography's of Change in 
the Post-Socialist World, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Brother-Hill/Oxford, 
1999, see “Introduction”. We use the term “transition” (with quotation marks) in absence 
of a better term that would unequivocally designate the wide transformation process 
following the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
2
  In 2001, the revenues of the Moldovan population represented 26% of 1989 figures. See 
Mihaly Simai, “Poverty and Inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS Transition 
Economies”, DESA Working Paper, no. 17, Feb. 2006, p. 12. 
3
  I would like to express my gratitude to Sergiu Cioclea and Valentin Lozovanu, both of 
them economic experts in June 2015, for reading this text at intermediate stages of editing 
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analyse and synthesise the main causes of the delay in the “transition”, as well 
as the social and political consequences resulting from that. 
 
 
The Reform of Political Institutions 
and the Foundations of a Weak State 
 
In the former Soviet Union, the transition to liberal democracy and 
market economy was preceded and prepared by the reforms introduced by the 
Soviet leadership in the second half of the 1980s, by the government led by 
M.S. Gorbachev during the period called “perestroika” (i.e. “restructuring”). 
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (then SSR of Moldova), as well as 
other Soviet republics, was characterized during this period by a movement 
labelled as “national liberation”. This movement appeared due to the emergence 
of political pluralism (in the same time with the appearance of movements for 
sustaining perestroika, evolving thereafter in the Popular Front4, Interfront 
“Unitate-Edinstvo”5, and Gagauz Halkî movement6) and by adopting economic 
                                                                                                                       
and for their suggestions. My gratitude also goes to Octavian Şcerbaţchi, financial expert 
and employee of the IMF office in Chișinău, for consultation. Also, the following experts 
have been interviewed in the framework of a project of documentary films about the 
Moldovan transition, directed by Victor Ciobanu (film maker) and advised by the author: 
Doru Petruţi, Igor Botan, and Sergiu Cioclea, along with several participants and 
witnesses of the “transition” (including two ex-Presidents of Moldova: Petru Lucinschi 
and Mircea Snegur). I would like to thank all of them on this occasion. These experts do 
not bear of course any responsibility for possible inaccuracies in the text. The full 
responsibility in this respect rests solely with the author. I also thank Adelina Hadârcă and 
Mircea Bordeianu for helping me with the translation of this article. 
4
  The Popular Front of Moldova, created in 1989, was the successor of the Movement for 
sustaining Perestroika, modelled on eponymous movements in other Soviet republics 
(namely the Baltic republics), and the predecessor of the Christian-Democratic Popular 
Front, then Christian-Democratic Popular Party. The Popular Front was the first political 
alternative to the Communist Party. It advocated for identity and linguistic rights of the 
ethnic Moldovans (Romanians) in the Moldavian SSR, namely for the recognition of the 
Moldovan (Romanian) language as a state language. See more at Charles King, The 
Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, Hoover Institution Press, 2000, 
p. 149, and Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet 
State, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 225-226. 
5
  The Inter-Movement “Unitate-Edinstvo” (“Unity”), the former Inter-Front (International 
Movement/Front), created in 1989 in Moldova (and other Soviet republics), proclaimed 
itself as being a left-wing movement advocating for the remaining of the Moldavian SSR 
in the USSR. It also advocated for the linguistic rights of the Russian speaking population 
in Moldova. See Neil Malvin, Russians Beyond Russia. Politics of National Identity, 
Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, pp. 69-71. 
6
  Gagauz Halkî (or Gagauz Khalky, in Eng. Gagauz People), created in 1989, was a 
movement advocating for the identity and linguistic rights of the Gagauz population in the 
Moldavian SSR. See Neil Malvin, Russians Beyond Russia…cit., pp. 70-71; Charles 
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reforms that have created the first legal framework for economic liberalization 
and the emergence of private enterprises. 
The last “Supreme Soviet” (legislative body) of Moldavian SSR was 
elected in February 1989, and then became the first Parliament of Moldova, up 
to the end of February 1994. The Parliament and the Government have imposed 
themselves as viable institutions with real decision-making power. Together 
with the creation and strengthening of institutions of justice, all institutional 
foundations were ready to build a state with separation of powers, as a premise 
of democracy and the rule of law7. 
After independence, several political parties have declared their 
affiliation to Western democratic doctrines (Christian-Democratic, Social-
Democratic, Liberal, etc.)8. Former Communist Party was banned immediately 
after independence, and its property was nationalized. However, in 1994, a 
political organization calling itself “Party of Communists from Republic of 
Moldova”, primarily composed by representatives of the former party elite, was 
officially registered9. 
The emerging political pluralism hardly hid, in fact, a merely 
reconcilable split of political and intellectual elites regarding the development 
path to be followed by the young state10. In spite of a common perception, the 
last Supreme Soviet, and consequently the first democratically elected 
Moldovan Parliament, was composed by 27% (or 94 out of 380 seats) by 
supporters of the Popular Front, all others being members of the Communist 
Party (“conservatives” and “reformers”) and representatives of the former 
administrative elite11. Hence most elected representatives, with quite divergent 
beliefs and backgrounds, voted the country’s independence rather driven by 1) 
immediate political circumstances of the failed putsch in Moscow, and 2) the 
                                                                                                                       
King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi”, Ethnic 
& Racial Studies, vol. 20, issue 4, Oct. 1997, pp. 738-756.  
7
  For an in-depth analysis of the political system in the 1990s, see Mihai Cernencu, Igor 
Boțan, The Evolution of the Multiparty System in Moldova, ADEPT, Chișinău, 2009. 
8
  See Mihai Cernencu, Igor Boțan, The Evolution of the Multiparty System…cit.. See also 
the platforms and doctrines of the parties of RM at ADEPT (Moldovan think-tank), URL: 
http://www.e-democracy.md/parties/. During February 1994 elections, there were 33 
candidates participating in the elections, including 4 electoral blocs, 9 parties or social 
movements and 20 independent candidates. ADEPT, URL : http://www.e-democracy.md/ 
elections/parliamentary/1994/, accessed on June 5, 2016. 
9
  See “The Party of Communists of Moldova”. ADEPT, URL: http://www.e-democracy.md/ 
parties/pcrm/, accessed on June 5, 2016.  
10
  See Lucan Way, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 4, 
October 2002, pp. 127-141. 
11
  Anatol Ţăranu, “The Parliament of Independence and the Transnistrian Conflict”, 
Akademos, no. 3 (22), September 2011, p. 13; Charles King, Moldovenii, România, Rusia 
şi politica culturală, transl. by Diana Stanciu, Chişinău, Arc, 2005, p. 150; P.K. Lucinski, 
“Ob itogakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov Moldovaskoi SSR i mestnykh sovetov”, 19 
March 1990: Archive of Social and Political Organizations of Republic of Moldova 
(AOSPRM), Fund 51, Inventory 74, file 92, p. 68.  
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broader context of national movements and fall of communism in the countries 
of Eastern Europe along with the USSR itself. Shortly after independence, the 
“conservative” wing, representing the majority of RM Parliament (consisting of 
representatives of the former administrative and party elite) made a common 
front against the “reformist” and nationalistic wing and their initiatives12. This 
was especially evident starting with 199313, a process labelled as “velvet 
restoration” by Adam Michnik14. 
Neither Moldovan society was any more homogeneous in terms of 
cultural and political preferences. It had at least 40% of non-Romanian speaking 
population (mostly Slavic and Russian-speaking), sharing diverse political 
positions15. In March 1991, Moldova sabotaged the organization of a 
referendum on its membership in the Soviet Union or any form of detachment 
from it. Unlike the Baltic republics, Moldova has not held any local referendum 
on the matter. The declaration of independence on 27 August 1991 was an event 
occurred exclusively with the decision of political elites and decided under the 
pressure from regional context and street movements, but without a real popular 
plebiscite. The few surveys made in the period of 1989-1991 showed a divided 
population on the question of the future of RM16. Thus, in a poll conducted in 
January 1991 on a representative sample of 1133 respondents, to the question 
“How [in what format] do you see the future of Moldova?” 43% of respondents 
saw it in the USSR, 42% ‒ as independent state and 3% ‒ within Romania. 
According to ethnic and linguistic belonging, as many as 55% of the 
respondents considering themselves as ethnic Moldovans were in favour of 
independence, Russians ‒ 9%, 8% of Ukrainians, 12% of Bulgarians and 26% 
of other nationalities. For the remaining of the Moldavian SSR in the USSR 
were in favour 30% of ethnic Moldovans, 76% of Russians, 73% of Ukrainians, 
95% of Gagauzi, 81% of Bulgarians, and 61% of other nationalities17. Despite 
possible methodological biases, these polls have provided plausible data. 
Furthermore, these data were considered by the political elite at the time while 
rejecting the possibility of a local referendum on the independence of Moldova 
until the official proclamation of it. A consultative referendum was held only on 
March 6, 1994, when the overwhelming majority of participants (95%) voted 
                                                 
12
  Charles King, The Moldovans…cit., pp. 150-155. 
13
  Specifically on January 28, 1993, when the President of the Parliament, Alexandru 
Moşanu, the Deputy Speaker Ion Hadârcă, the Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Commission for Media, Valeriu Matei, and Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission 
for External Relations Vasile Nedelciuc resigned from the respective positions, 
motivating by the desire to inform the public regarding the danger of restoration of the 
totalitarian regime in Moldova. 
14
  Adam Michnik, Irena Grudzinska-Gross, Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities 
and Perspectives, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998. 
15
  See below the public opinion polls of 1990-1991. 
16
  See, among other documents, AOSPRM, F. 51, Inv. 74, f. 106, p. 7-8; AOSPRM, 
51/74/106, pp. 16-21; AOSPRM, 51/74/107, pp. 21-30. 
17
  AOSPRM, 51/74/107, pp. 21, 30. 
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for independence of RM (and, implicitly, against integration into Romania or 
Russia). Such debates were held in the context of geopolitical disputes in certain 
mainstream political and intellectual circles and with the involvement of 
“agrarian” politicians18 who were in favour of “Moldovenism” (i.e. proclaiming 
the ethno-national particularity of the Moldovan people in the RM)19. 
After independence, the Moldovan authorities have decided to grant 
citizenship rights to all inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova until the date of 
the proclamation of independence, unlike the Baltic States, where Slavic 
minorities were denied the right to citizenship. This political and cultural 
pluralism in its infancy20 led to the development and implementation of a 
nationality and linguistic policy, considered by some observers as a model of 
peaceful and democratic integration of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Thus, in 
RM, Russian language became – and has remained so far – a “language of inter-
ethnic communication”, benefiting from a relatively privileged status, although 
ambiguous and therefore interpretable21. 
Further evidence of emerging democratic pluralism of 90s, appearing as 
a continuation of democratization reforms started during perestroika, was the 
proclamation and observance of civil liberties. More specific would be the 
freedom of expression that led to the editing of several newspapers and 
magazines with diverse political and cultural orientation and edited both in 
Romanian and in Russian22. A permissive policy towards foreign media also led 
to wide dissemination in the local media space of foreign TV channels from 
Romania and especially from Russian Federation. The latter became (actually, 
remained) more popular than local stations that were (and still are) 
incomparably less developed. This popularity in the Moldovan media space of 
foreign broadcast stations allowed a wide dissemination of all communication 
strategies from “neighbouring” capitals, Bucharest and especially Moscow23. At 
                                                 
18
  The Democratic Agrarian Party, mainly consisting of leaders of the former rural and 
kolkhoz administration, came at power after the elections of February 1994, holding 56 
seats from 101. See ADEPT, URL: http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/ parliamentary/ 
1994/, accessed on June 7, 2016. 
19
  Charles King, “Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism”, Slavic Review, 
vol. 53, no. 2, 1994, pp. 345-368. 
20
  Lucan Way, “Pluralism by Default…cit.”. 
21
  See Igor Cașu, Igor Șarov (eds.), Republica Moldova de la Perestroika la independenţă 
1989-1991, Cartdidact, Chişinău, 2011; see also Frederica Prina, Linguistic Divisions and 
Language Charter – The Case of Moldova, ECMI Working Paper No. 64, March 2013, p. 7; 
Charles King, The Moldovans…cit., pp. 172-173. 
22
  In 1995, 200 newspaper titles appeared (with a total circulation of 1.5 million copies), of 
which 77 in Romanian, and 87 magazines and other periodicals, including 43 in 
Romanian (with a total circulation of 700,000 copies). Source: National Office of 
Statistics of RM. See also Ludmila Barbă, “Mass-media din Republica Moldova şi Pactul 
de Stabilitate”, IPP Moldova, 2002. URL: www.ipp.md/public/files/Publicatii/2002/, 
accessed on June 10, 2016.  
23
  According to the Strategy of the Coordinating Council (BCC) covering the national 
territory with broadcasting services (2007-2010), July 2007 (URL: http://www.cca.md/ 
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the same time, all Moldovan governments have tried to control local media in 
their own purposes of political promotion. One of the well noticeable trends 
since 2000 to current days is the control over the media market by political 
leaders also involved as prosperous business entrepreneurs24. 
The recognition and international support had not occurred equally 
strongly and immediately as in the Baltic States, for example. As Baltic 
republics’ elites and populations seemed more determined to embrace a “pro-
Western” transition, they benefited very quickly from a strong support of 
Western countries (primarily from USA and Nordic European states). Shortly 
after independence and failed putsch of August 1991, these republics have been 
widely recognized by the international community, and as quick as in 
September 1991 they were admitted to United Nations25. In contrast with the 
Baltic countries, Moldova has been recognized immediately after the 
declaration of independence only by Romania, Georgia and Lithuania. RM’s 
recognition by foreign states and international structures came only after the 
official and definitive collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and especially 
after the acceptance of Moldova in March 1992 to United Nations26. 
                                                                                                                       
STRATEGIA_CCA.doc) the national broadcasting is at disadvantage in Moldova as 
compared to foreign radio and TV stations. Thus, “at a ratio of 72% and 13% representing 
the ethnic majority vs. Russian minority in Moldova, there are more than 80 radio and TV 
stations retransmitting programs in Russian while only 13 stations mainly in Romanian”. 
Angela Sârbu, “Challenges and Performances Moldovan Press,” CIJ, URL: 
http://ijc.md/Publicatii/provocari.pdf; According to the Public Opinion Barometer, 
ordered in April 2002 by the Institute for Public Policy, 48% of respondents manifested 
confidence in TV stations from Russia (and 50% in national TV). According to the poll 
conducted by IMAS, Inc. [Institute of Marketing and Polls] and ordered by CIJ [Center of 
Independent Journalism] in 2003, the question “What channels are you watching most?” 
had the following responses: “1) ORT [first Russian TV channel]: first mention 30.9% 
(and 24.2% of second mention), 2) TV Moldova: 30.6% (18.2%), 3) Romania 1: 31.1% 
(10.6%)”. See TV Audience in Moldova, IMAS, October 2003. URL: 
http://ijc.md/Publicatii/sondaj/tv_octombrie_2003.pdf, accessed on June 15 2016.  
24
  Doina Costin, Mamuka Andguladze, Transparence of the Ownership of Mass-Media in Republic 
of Moldova, Center of Independent Journalism, Chișinău, 2012. URL: http://www.ijc.md/ 
Publicatii/studii_mlu/transparenta%20media%20eng/studiu-transparenta-eng.pdf, accessed on 
June 15, 2015. 
25
  Andrea Kasecamp, A History of the Baltic States, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 172; 
Lithuania profile: history. U.S. Department of State Background Notes. URL: 
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/lithuania/191349.htm.  
26
  “Among the most important objectives, naturally, there was the international recognition 
of the Republic of Moldova as a subject of international law. The process of international 
recognition of Moldova’s independence was quite long and difficult one: it started 
together with the necessary decisions taken on the day of August 27 by the Governments 
of Romania and Georgia, followed by an uncertain period until December 1991, when 
Moscow only after receiving the commitments from former republics (except the Baltic 
States) to join the CIS, finally expressed readiness to establish diplomatic relations with 
Chișinău. This step paved the way for Moscow’s recognition of independence of the 
Republic of Moldova and the Western powers, followed by the acceptance to UN on 
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Moldova’s relations with Romania have evolved over the period that 
followed the declaration of independence on two levels, one expressed in 
cultural projects with identity character, most visible, and another having a 
more pragmatic and economic aim. Trade relationships (import/export) between 
Moldova and Romania, though inferior to those between Moldova and Russia, 
have been growing ever since 2000s, and in 2014 they surpassed Moldova’s 
trade with Russia27. Intergovernmental Agreement between Moldavian SSR and 
Romania in May 1990 to allow a large number of Moldovan students to do their 
studies at colleges and universities in Romania28 made possible a significant 
complementary training of Moldovan elites, compensating for the decreasing 
quality of secondary and higher education in Moldova and for reduced access to 
education in universities of Russian Federation. At the same time, the access to 
Romanian universities starting with September 1990 also created a competitive 
context for universities in Moldova that played in the disadvantage of the 
latest29. One more side effect was the “brain-drain”30. Some studies have shown 
that a significant number of Moldovan students in Romania prefer to remain in 
Romania after graduation or to continue further abroad. Finally, for the 
Romanian state, this investment has had an evident role as a soft power strategy 
and an instrument of influence in the R. of Moldova31. 
                                                                                                                       
2 March 1992. This ended the first phase, of extremely importance for the affirming of the 
Republic of Moldova on the international arena.” Iurie Leancă, “Evolution of External 
Relations”, in Transition: Retrospectives and Perspectives, ADEPT, Chişinău, Gunivas, 
2002, p. 361.  
27
  According to National Bureau of Statistics (hereinafter, NBS), URL: http://www.statistica.md/ 
category.php?l=ro&idc=336&.See especially the data time series for the years 1997-2013 
for export and import of RM with other countries.  
28
  In May 1990, the prime minister of SSR Moldova, Mircea Druc and ministry of education 
Dumitru Mătcaş, together with the Romanian counterparts decided the admission of about 
500 young Moldavians at universities and high schools in Romania. From an interview 
with M. Druc, conducted by the author (from own archive). See also “Pentru tinerii care 
vor să-şi facă studiile în România”, Făclia, 24, nr. 8, 1990, p. 10.  
29
  This competition is aggravated by the gradual decrease in total number of students 
(similarly to Romania). For the first cycle, for example, the number of students decreased 
from 122,709 in 2005 to 71,150 in 2014. See NBS table: “Students in Institutions of 
Higher Education after General Fields of Study, Years and Cycles”. Many faculties 
(departments) signalled a drastic reduction in the number of students overall. For example 
in the faculties of social sciences, the number of students decreased from 2819 in 2005 to 
973 in 2014. NBS, Ibidem. 
30
  Research results shows that 82% of Moldovan graduates, fellows of the Romanian state, 
remain in Romania or move to other countries. Thus, according to these estimates, only 17% 
return in Moldova after graduation (see fig. 13). This is confirmed by a high percentage of 
interviewed graduates currently living in Romania (see fig. 14). Claudia Silaghi, “Good 
Intentions and Bureaucratic Nightmare. The Paradox of Scholarships Granted by the 
Romania to Moldovan Students”, Policy Memo, no. 24, January 2012, p. 30. 
31
  Thus, according to the study led by Radu Baltasiu, Traiectoria tinerilor basarabeni veniți 
la studii în România ‒ între mit și realitate. Raport de cercetare, The Centre for Study of 
Ethnic Problems of the Academy of Science, “Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi” Institute for the 
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The armed conflict on the Dniester, held during September 1990-July 
1992, resulted in more than 1,000 victims32. This conflict de facto separated 
Moldova into two entities: Moldova itself, with the capital in Chișinău, and the 
so-called Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, unrecognized by the international 
community so far (even Russia). The event, painful and traumatic in itself for 
the populations on both sides of the river, has also produced a number of 
negative consequences in terms of political, social and economic development 
of both territories. The maintenance of the Russian military contingent in the 
region, supported by the leaders and residents of the left bank of Nistru 
(Dniester) River had marked throughout the whole Republic of Moldova as an 
area of interest and influence of Russia. In addition, not recognized 
internationally, the separatist republic of Transnistria has served since long as a 
“haven” for illicit trafficking of goods (including illicit ones)33, especially until 
January 199934, when it was decided to create a customs checkpoints at the 
crossings in and out of Transnistria. This has long maintained a negative 
influence on the investment climate in Moldova, on the both sides. Bilateral 
negotiations continued in various formats from one government to another, without 
any positive impact on the living standards of the populations of both banks35. 
 
 
1990s: Liberal Economic Reforms 
and the First Phase of “State Capture” 
 
Unlike the countries of the former socialist camp in Eastern Europe, the 
former Soviet republics went through a deeper economic crisis due to their 
integration into industrial and energy complexes of the Soviet empire. This 
dependency remained largely valid after 1991. The great Soviet industrial complex 
in Moldova, one third of which was based in Transnistria, proved largely to be 
ineffective after the fall of the USSR. This was based on the industries’ 
                                                                                                                       
Romanian Diaspora, Ed. Etnologică, București, 2012, p. 12, “More than half of young 
people surveyed know that there is a common destiny of all Romanians. 65.7 % claim the 
unification of Moldova and Romania [65.7 % answers “yes” to the question “Do you 
agree with the reunification of Bessarabia with Romania?”]”. 
32
  Cf. Arcadie Barbăroșie, Oazu Nantoi (eds.), Aspects of the Transnistrian Conflict, 
Institute of Public Policies, Chişinău, 2004.  
33
  Ibidem, p. 28. 
34
  Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova: Causes 
and Consequences, Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, 1999, p. 68. 
35
  About negotiations progress between Chişinău and Tiraspol: Igor Boțan, Reglementarea 
transnistreană: o soluţie europeană, ADEPT, 2009 (a copy can be accessed here); Also 
see Vitalie Gămurari, “Statutul forţelor pacificatoare în dreptul internaţional: cazul 
Republicii Moldova”, PROMO-LEX, 2015, and an interview with the V. Gămurari at 
Radio Europa Liberă, URL: http://www.europalibera.mobi/a/26817340.html, accessed on 
June 15, 2016.  
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dependencies on Russian raw materials and energy, and the market for their goods 
limited to former Soviet republics. Almost overnight, electricity and fuel imported 
from Russia became an expensive resource for equally exhausted industry and 
population that had to sacrifice other expenditure to cover energy bills36. 
Once recognized internationally, Moldova has upsurge, along with all 
other ex-communist countries, including Russia, into a true “revolutionary” 
economic and social “transition” to a market economy – which was to be 
undertaken with technical and financial assistance of international financial 
institutions, primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank 
(IBRD) and the European Bank for Reform and Development (EBRD). 
“Liberalization, stabilization, privatization” have become the watchwords of the 
new “liberal revolution”. Price liberalization, applied in early 1992, gave vent to 
an inflation of huge proportions (1670% in 1992 and 2706% in 1993)37. This 
was a result of previously centrally controlled prices with different means of 
financial mechanisms that hid deep deficiencies of the Soviet financial and 
economic system38. This hyperinflation39 devalued people’s savings, impoverishing 
                                                 
36
  Thus, the cost of energy imports rose from 1.4 billion roubles in 1991 to 40 billion roubles 
in 1992, equivalent to 55% of the cost of all imports (that constituted 14% in 1987). See 
World Bank, Moldova: Moving to a Market Economy, The World Bank, Washington DC, 
1994, p. 6. Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s Transition to Destitution, Sida Studies 
no. 1, Sida’s Information Centre, Gothenburg, 2000, p. 17. URL: http://www.sida.se/ 
globalassets/publications/import/pdf/en/moldovas-transition-to-destitution.pdf, accessed 
on June 15, 2015. 
37
  See NBS. Other data sources give slightly different figures in this respect, namely 1280% 
in 1992 and 1184% in 1993. See Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin 
Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit., p. 6; EBRD, Transition Report, 2003, Table 
A.3.3, p. 58; David E. Altig, Ed Nosal (eds.), Monetary Policy in Low-Inflation 
Economies, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 218. 
38
  About Soviet economic system deficiencies, see a critical point of view from a Russian 
liberal, engaged in economic reforms in Russia after 1991: Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an 
Empire. Lessons for Modern Russia, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007. 
The author argues, inter alia, that the Soviet economic system had already collapsed 
before the new system set up. See also Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin 
Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit. 
39
  Some economists qualify that inflation as a hyperinflation (estimated by a less precise 
definition, as the following: “Extremely rapid or out of control inflation. There is no 
precise numerical definition to hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is a situation where the 
price increases are so out that the concept of control of inflation is meaningless”. 
Investopedia date (URL: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hyperinflation.asp, 
accessed on June 16, 2016). See also Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin 
Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit., p. 6; Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s 
Transition…cit., pp. 72-73. However, according to a more precise definition (ex.: 
“Although the threshold is arbitrary, economists generally reserve the term 
‘hyperinflation’ to describe episodes when the monthly inflation rate is greater than 50 
percent. At a monthly rate of 50 percent, an item that cost $1 on January 1 would cost 
$130 on January 1 of the following year”. Michael K. Salemi, “Hyperinflation”, The 
Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics, URL: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ 
550 PETRU NEGURĂ 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 4  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most citizens of Moldova. The ravages of inflation were curbed by the end of 
1993, when national currency, “Moldovan Leu”, was created, thanks to the 
support of IMF40. The consistent application of the monetary stabilization policy 
from 1993 to 1997 helped to stabilize the national currency relative to the US 
dollar, regaining public confidence that was lost due to inflation in the years of 
1991-9341. Diligent application by Moldovan governments (led by V. 
Muravschi, then A. Sangheli) of liberalization and monetary stability policies 
have attracted praise for Moldova from international financial institutions so 
that, in 1995, The Economist qualified RM as “a model of correct reform”42, 
despite deep budgetary crisis.  
This momentary success had a high price. Even if Moldova hit the road 
in August 1991 without external debt (Russia assuming the debt of the former 
USSR), Moldova had not in 1991 any currency or gold reserves (unlike the 
Baltic countries and Russia, the latter inheriting most gold reserves of URSS43). 
Therefore, to ensure development of the country, Moldovan authorities have 
contracted from international financial institutions (primarily the IMF and 
World Bank) a number of medium-term loans with an interest rate of about 
5%44. This rate, although much lower than the interest rate on the financial 
markets at that time45, was higher in 1993-1997 than by 199746. In 1997, when 
the economic crisis was at its top, RM has acquired the status of developing 
country according to IDA, as its GDP per capita was recognized small enough 
to receive concessional credits (with subsidized interest rate). In 1997, 
Moldova became one of the most indebted countries in the region, relative to 
                                                                                                                       
Hyperinflation.html, the monetary devaluation in RM in the years 1991-1993 can be 
labelled as a “major inflation”, but not as a “hyperinflation” in the strict sense. 
40
  Ibidem, pp. 7-8. 
41
  National currency deposits in banks in Moldova increased from less than 400 million lei 
in January 1994 at about 1.6 billion lei in December 1997. Artur Radziwitt, Octavian 
Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit., p. 15  
42
  “Moldova is a model of correct reform, and the fact that it is a small country transforms it 
into a perfect laboratory for running reforms”, The Economist, March 1995, cited by 
Angela Munteanu, in “The Social Costs of the transition in Moldova”, South-East Europe 
Review for Labour and Social Affairs, issue no. 3, 2000, p. 3543. 
43
  Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in 
Moldova…cit., p. 6. 
44
  See credits from IMF in 1993-2013. URL: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/ 
extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=672&endDate=2015-03-31, accessed on June 16, 2016.  
45
  According to estimation based on rates charged by LIBOR (London Interbank Offered 
Rate) and risk margin (or SPREAD sovereign), interest for commercial loans which 
Moldova could had benefited in 1993-1997 would vary around 10%. 
46
  Since Moldova, like other countries in the region, did not qualify for the status of 
“developing” country, according to IDA/DAC (International Development Association), 
not having a sufficiently low GDP , after calculations of the World Bank time (which, 
according to some experts, was based on some outdated Soviet data on the country’s gross 
domestic product). Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s Transition…cit., pp. 11, 48-49. 
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GDP per capita47. Accumulated stock of foreign debt has reached about 1.3 
billion USD on 1 January 1999, which represented almost 80% of GDP48. These 
debts, along with the interest, started being returned from 2000 until 2007, 
constituting a real burden for the economic development of the country49. The 
same year when the country became qualified for concessional loans, the same 
financial institutions had also penalised Moldova by interrupting granting 
credits for two years for perceived unbalanced budget allocation that violated 
the austerity measures recommended in order to reduce public spending 
(including social)50. It is necessary to note, though, that governments in the 
1990s in Moldova received significant amount of external debt and domestic 
borrowing (including from population by unpaid salaries on time), without 
justifying them by solid and visible investment in infrastructure projects, 
modernization of enterprises or improving public services51. Therefore it is 
reasonable to ask: what was the economic and social benefit of foreign and 
domestic debt contracted by Moldovan governments in the 1990s? 
The fragile economic stabilization in 1997 was also shaken by another 
external factor: the economic and financial crisis in Russia in August 1998. 
Under the influence of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia and the extreme 
decline of prices for crude oil, Russia went insolvent. This was recognized 
internally as well as outside the country and seemed to mark the failure of 
development road that was traced with the help of international experts and 
financial institutions52. As Moldova has maintained and developed trade 
                                                 
47
  Ibidem. 
48
  The share of external debt relative to exports increased from 17% in 1997 to 30% in 1998. 
Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in 
Moldova…cit., p. 65. 
49
  About the external financial and technical assistance to Moldova, see Valentin Lozovanu, 
“External Assistance and Development. To What Extent External Assistance Has Contributed 
to the Development of Moldova?”, in PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică socială (part 1 
and 2), June 2014. URL: http://www.platzforma.md/asistenta-externa-si-dezvoltare-in-ce-
masura-asistenta-externa-a-contribuit-la-dezvoltarea-moldovei-1/, accessed on June 16, 
2016. See also Idem, Foreign Aid and Development: Promoting Success or Failure in 
Development Moldova’s?, Master of Arts thesis in Global Political Economy, University 
of Kassel, 2014; Iurie Gotișan, “Moldova’s Economy and the IMF”, Governance and 
Democracy. Review of Analysis and Synthesis, ADEPT, 2009, pp. 59-61; Maia 
Sandu,“External Assistance”, in Government Priorities 2009, by ADEPT association, 
with the support of UNDEF, Chișinău, 2009, pp. 311-328. 
50
  Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s Transition…cit., p. 65. 
51
  See, as example, Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial 
Crisis in Moldova…cit. 
52
  See summaries of two perspectives on the crisis in Russia, one in favour of liberal 
reforms: Anders Aslund, How Capitalism Was Built. The Transformation of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, 2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, and another one, more critical: Jacques Sapir, La Transition russe, 
vingt ans après, Éd. des Syrtes, Paris, 2012. For an economic analysis that predicts the 
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relations excessively with Russia, Moldova’s fragile economy entered to its turn 
in a recession close to insolvency53. To overcome the crisis, the government 
led by Mr. Ciubuc and those following in 1999 and 2000 (led by I. Sturza and 
D. Braghiş respectively) were forced to apply austerity reforms and continue at 
a sustained pace the privatization program, begun during the government lead 
by Mr. Sangheli. 
The third phase of the model (first two being price liberalization and 
stabilization of currency) that Moldova should follow to achieve the transition 
to a market economy was the privatization of state enterprises and collective 
farms. Starting with 1 January 1994, citizens of Moldova were receiving the 
patrimonial bonds (so-called “vouchers”) with which they could have bought 
state assets and equity shares of enterprises listed for privatization by the state. 
According to the Government estimates of 10 July 1996, “Over a year and a 
half were organized 15 subscription auctions for shares, 94 public auctions and 
11 competitions. Patrimonial bonds were used to privatize 2,235 enterprises 
(wholly or partially) and 191,000 apartments”54. This reform aimed to create 
prerequisites for the development of the securities and real estate markets, the 
restructuring of privatized enterprises and the establishment of mechanisms for 
corporate governance (ibidem). In reality, according to independent observers 
and the Court of Auditors55, the privatization of enterprises was made without 
necessary transparency with a serious violations committed by the Ministry of 
Privatization mainly with profitable companies being overtaken by interest 
groups close to the government of the time (the Agrarian Party majority) at 
much lower prices than their real value. The ordinary population remained 
instead with completely devalued bonds. At least one positive aspect of 
privatization was a virtually “free” acquisition of the apartments and houses by 
                                                                                                                       
1998 crisis in Russia, see Sergiu Cioclea, “Y a-t-il une vie après la stabilisation russe?”, 
Conjoncture, no. 11, December 1997, pp. 1-8. 
53
  Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s Transition…cit.; Artur Radziwitt, Octavian 
Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit. 
54
  DECISION No. 305 of 10.6.1996 on totals of patrimonial bonds during privatization and 
post-privatization phase tasks. Published on 04.07.1996 in the Monitorul Oficial, no. 45, 
No. art: 382 (modified: HG511 / 03.06.99, MO59/10.06.99). URL: http://lex.justice.md/ 
index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=296094, accessed on June 20, 2016. 
55
  We quote from the Court of Auditors of 04/03/1998: “Ministry of Privatization and State 
Property Administration, as central organ of state power that realises state policy in the 
field of denationalization and privatization of state assets, is guilty of serious breaches of 
legislation with effect on state property in privatization against patrimonial bonds (PB) 
and against cash. [...] After the first checks on the work of the ministry in 1995, the 
situation regarding the legality of the privatization process did not change. Moreover it 
was detected even more serious violations”. REPORT [The] Court of Moldova on the 
control of results in 1997 on the management and use of public financial and material 
resources. DECISION No. PAR 03/04/1998. URL: http://lex.justice.md/ index.phpaction= 
view&view=doc&lang=1&id=306317. 
The Republic of Moldova’s Transition 553 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 4  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
their inhabitants. However, even in this area there were registered multiple 
frauds which resulted in numerous vulnerable people (poor and uninformed) 
losing their homes56. 
Formally started immediately after independence, the privatization of 
land and agricultural goods met great difficulties and resistance even higher 
than the privatization of industrial enterprises. Until 1997, technical and legal 
difficulties of privatization were caused by agrarian governments (Sangheli 
governments 1 and 2: 1992-1997), but also by resistance “from below”, from 
farm workers, who were against the abolishment of collective farms. It was only 
in 1997, under pressure from international financial organizations, when the 
government lead by Prime Minister Ciubuc, conducted with the assistance of 
the World Bank the “Land” program (“Pământ” in Rom.). The program 
included the legal framework required to unlock the privatization of state 
agricultural properties and their registration in the state cadastre. The 
privatization process was intended transparent and equitable, designed to 
distribute shares of land to each farm worker, including pensioners, with an 
average of about 1.5ha of land per person57. The “Land” program resulted in a 
systemic dismantling of collective farms and agricultural associations through 
ownership transfer to the people living in rural areas. Despite the good 
intentions of the architects and implementing parties of the program, de-
collectivisation and land privatization was followed by a sharp decrease in 
productivity (agricultural production has halved in 1991-199958). We must 
remember that the privatization of agricultural property started and took place in 
a general context of economic decline, during which public investments in 
agricultural sector were very low. This period of economic uncertainty, during 
the agrarian governments, has facilitated the theft and frauds of considerable 
proportions of property previously owned by collective farms59. 
                                                 
56
  According to the estimation of the Centre for Housing and Orientation of Homeless 
Persons, a large number of homeless people ended up in this condition for reasons of 
fraud to which they were subjected, especially in that period. See Petru Negură, 
“Persoanele fără adăpost din Chişinău: forme de excluziune şi strategii de adaptare”, 
PLATZFORMA. Revistă de critică socială, 30/12/2015. URL: http://www.platzforma.md/ 
persoanele-fara-adapost-din-Chișinău-forme-de-excluziune-si-tactici-de-supravietuire-1/. 
57
  About privatisation of agricultural sector see Nora Dudwick, Karin Fock, David Sedik, 
Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Transition Countries. The Experience of 
Bulgaria, Moldova, Azerbaidjan, and Kazakhstan. World Bank Working Paper, No. 104, 
World Bank, Washington DC, 2007.  
58
  Ibidem, p. 19. By 2000, the agricultural production starts a slow recovering. 
59
  Between 1995 and 2001 the total number of recorded crimes varies between 38,409 and 
37,830. Of these, 26,877 and 26,906 respectively represent embezzlement. In 1998, out of 
the total number of 36,195 offenses, 13,393 were committed in Chișinău municipality, the 
rest – 22,802 – in other counties and cities. RM Statistical Yearbook, 2002, BNS, p. 224. 
Also, “In 1998, employees of the Department of Financial Control and Revision 
performed 9,506 documentary revisions and operational controls, with 2,353 fewer than in 
554 PETRU NEGURĂ 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 4  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The privatization of the public goods during the 1990s continued the 
next decades and modelled a practice, continued to varying degree by all the 
following governments, of “colonization” of the state by vested interests to the 
expense of public benefit. Similarly, the collection of income tax was applied in 
an unsystematic way, allowing massive tax evasion60 in favour of some 
economic agents while setting an unjustified economic burden on others61. 
These distorted economic policies created a very fragile business environment, 
characterised by corrupt practices and clientele relations between businesses 
and state officials. Economic crime – corruption, extortion and informal 
protection (the so-called “krysha”62) – in which private groups were involved 
together with high-rank state officials have significantly damaged the business 
environment and investment climate of the young emerging economy, 
maintaining the citizens’ distrust of the emerging state structures63. 
 
 
The Social Effects of the 1990s “Transition” 
 
Despite the efforts of the Sangheli and (the first) Ciubuc governments 
to provide sufficient state support in the social sphere (education, health, and 
social welfare), these services suffered a profound crisis towards the end of the 
1990s, due to reduced state financial support64, prolonged delays in wage 
                                                                                                                       
the same period of 1997. Despite this, the total amount of damage caused to businesses 
and state, related to illegitimate deprivation and embezzlement, constituted 87.4 million 
lei compared to 36.3 million lei in 1997 (2.4 fold increase)”. Lilia Carașciuc, “Corruption 
in Moldova: Macroeconomic Impact”, in Corruption. Studies on Different Aspects of 
Corruption in Moldova, Ed. Arc, Chișinău 2000, p. 236. See also National Report on 
Human Development, “Social Cohesion”, UNDP, 1997, p. 36. 
60
  According to Lilia Caraşciuc, “Corruption in Moldova…cit.”, “tax evasion in Moldova 
increased from 4% of consolidated budget income in 1994 to 30% in 1998 and 22% in 
1999. The average volume of evasion on a taxpayer’s total, increased from 7,000 lei in 
1997 (10,000 lei by legal entities) to 12,000 lei in 1998 (23,000 lei by legal entities) and 
8,000 lei in 1999 (15,000 lei by legal entities). The density of the number of offenses 
subject to tax controls increased from 30% in 1994 to 59% in 1999” (p. 236). 
61
  Artur Radziwitt, Octavian Șcerbațchi, Constantin Zaman, Financial Crisis in Moldova…cit., 
p. 47. 
62
  In Russian, “krysha” is a common, argotic term meaning “protection” (literally: “roof”).  
63
  Thus, based on a survey with economic entities from 20 countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Moldova held the last place (20th) according to “governance index”. See EBRD 
Transition Report 1999, table 6.1, p. 116 (see also other issues). Likewise, the perception 
of “state capture” was 46% against 15% in Estonia, 17% in Lithuania, 27% in Romania, 
41% in Russia and 60% (maximum rate) in Azerbaijan. Ibidem, chart 6.3, p. 119. 
64
  Public budgetary expenses in R. Moldova for education and research were as follows (in 
mln. lei): 567 (in 1995), 833 (1996), 890 (1997), 640 (1998), 567 (1999); for health: 366 
(1995), 521 (1996), 537 (1997), 393 (1998), 358 (1999). Despite these seemingly high 
expenses, compared to the public budget and the GDP (9.8% in 1996 and 7.7% in 1997), 
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payment for civil servants, and rising inequalities in accessing the above-
mentioned services, which were furthermore exacerbated by the introduction of 
some local legal, as well as informal, tariffs, in these fields (particularly in the 
health and education institutions). The profound economic crisis, aggravated in 
1998-1999 by a regional crisis, as well as a prolonged non-payment of salaries, 
had thrown 70% of the population (or 84,6%, according to international 
standards65) below the limit of absolute poverty66, and 50% (or 55,4%) of the 
population below the limit of extreme poverty67. At the same time, income 
inequalities increased68, further narrowing the middle class segment of the 
population – still considered relatively fortunate under the circumstances – and 
also leading to the emergence of a new group of rich people, which was still 
small, but was gradually increasing69. 
                                                                                                                       
their actual value diminished thrice compared to 1989, due to inflation. Per Ronnas, Nina 
Orlova, Moldova’s Transition…cit., p. 65.  
65
  The World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000, table 1.1; UNECE population estimates [URL: www.unece.org/stats/ 
data.htm], quoted by: Economic Survey of Europe, 2004 No. 1, p. 169. 
66
  The threshold of absolute poverty “represents the amount of money necessary to ensure a 
daily intake of 2.282 Kcal and the purchase of non-food products and services of first 
necessity, whose costs are estimated on the basis of the consumption model of the needy”. 
Natalia Șonțu, Fenomenul sărăciei – problema mondială şi naţională: cauze, consecinţe, 
soluţii, Moldova State University, Chişinău, 2012, pp. 50-59. 
67
  “The threshold of extreme poverty is based on the monetary value of a daily 
consumer basket, defined based on a minimum daily consumption of calories. In 
2002, in R. Moldova the food threshold was set at 2,282 Kcal per day. However, if the 
average for an adult person had been used instead of the average minimum per person, 
then the minimum of the average calorie consumption would be of 3,004 
calories/person/day.” Natalia Șonțu, Fenomenul sărăciei…cit., p. 52.  
68
  The Gini coefficient (which indicates the ratio between the smallest and the largest 
incomes) was of 0.25 in 1989 (“Poverty in Eastern Europe and the CIS”, in Economic 
Survey of Europe, 2004, No. 1, p. 166). The Gini index has increased considerably 
throughout the 1990s, then dropped in 2006-2007, only to increase again in 2008 (a year 
of crisis): 0.41 (1992), 0.43 (1993) (ibidem, p. 117); 0.38 (1994), 0.39 (1995), 0.44 
(1999), 0.42 (2000), 0.43 (2001), 0.42 (2002), 0.39 (2003), 0.40 (2004), 0.41 (2005), 
0.315 (2006), 0.298 (2007), 0.38 (2008). This estimate was made by N. Şonţu based on 
data from the National Statistics Bureau (NSB). Natalia Șonțu, Fenomenul sărăciei…cit., 
p. 56. According to the World Bank, the Gini index continued to drop in R. Moldova in 
early 2010: 32.1 (2010), 30.6 (2011) (URL: http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SI.POV.GINI). 
To compare, in Latvia, the Gini coefficient has had a much more balanced evolution: 
0.244 (1989), 0.333 (1992), 0.283 (1993), 0.325 (1994), 0.346 (1995), 0.349 (1996), 
0.336 (1997), 0.332 (1998), 0.333 (1999), 0.337 (2000), 0.322 (2001). Economic Survey 
of Europe, 2004, No. 1, p. 167. 
69
  The ratio between the income of the 10% of the best-off and worst-off of the population 
was as follows: 9.3 (1995), 10.0 (1996), 16.0 (1997), 12.3 (1998), 14.4 (1999), 10.4 
(2000), 9.7 (2001). The Yearly Statistics Paper of R. Moldova, p. 103. This ratio was, in 
2000, of 7.2 in Romania, and of 20.3 in Russia. Mihaly Simai, “Poverty and Inequality in 
Eastern Europe...cit.”, pp. 15-17. 
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The drastic cuts operated in the health and education budgets, and the 
chronic non-payment of civil servants’ wages – which were already the 
smallest, compared to the average salary – have justified, according to a wide-
spread perception, the emergence of acts of corruption at all levels. Distrust in 
state institutions, coupled with decreasing revenues, led to an unprecedented 
rise in anomic behaviours (acts of violence, alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.70) 
and crime, topped throughout the 1990s by thefts71. The massive outflow of 
civil servants and employees from public institutions (of education and health) 
and agriculture72, produced a chain-reaction of strategies for survival: a transfer 
into informal sectors of the economy (particularly the informal trade and small 
cross-border traffic)73 and, by the end of the 1990s, labour migration abroad 
(see below).  
                                                 
70
  The number of persons (per 100,000 inhabitants) addicted to narcotic substances was on a 
constant rise from 7.1 (1995), to 9.6 (1996), 22.3 (1997), 31.5 (1998), 34.2 (1999), 33.2 
(2000). The number of persons suffering from alcoholism remained constant between 
1995 and 2000, ranging between 110 and 120 per 100.000 inhabitants. Yearly Statistics 
Paper of R. Moldova, 2002, p. 198. 
71
  See footnote 59 for data offered by the NBS on the crime rates evolution, in particular on 
thefts, throughout the 1990s. Some experts in criminology estimate a significant increase 
in violent crimes in the same period. Thus, “the destructive coefficient in the last years [as 
compared to 2007] constituted 8.4 yearly units, while in 1985 it was only 1.5. This means 
that the process of intensification of violence in society had increased until 1985 five 
times, and from 1986 to present-day – 24 times. These conclusions can also be 
corroborated by other data. Thus, if the frequency rates of the mentioned crimes have 
increased in the last 20 years with 464%, then the population level in the same period rose 
by 120,7%”. Igor A. Ciobanu, Criminologie, vol. 2, Moldova State University, 2007, p. 38. 
URL: http://drept.usm.md/public/files/CRIMINologie-Vol2341cc.pdf, accessed on June 
20, 2016. 
72
  From 1990 to 1998, the number of people employed in agriculture has decreased from 
678 to 411 thousand; in the field of medical assistance, from 15 to 86 thousand; in 
education, from 232 to 142 thousand. Yearly Statistics Paper 1994 (1995: 90); Yearly 
Statistics Paper 1996 (1997: 127-128); cited by Per Ronnas, Nina Orlova, Moldova’s 
Transition…cit., p. 74. The number of wage-earners (in the formal sector) had decreased, 
from 1996 to 2001, in the field of education from 147 to 90.9 thousand; in health care and 
social assistance, from 90.9 to 54.1 thousand. Yearly Statistics Paper 2002, p. 78. 
According to estimates made by the Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, in 1999, 
the informal sector represented 65% of the economy. United Nations Development 
Programme, National Human Development Report. 2000, United Nations: Chișinău. 
Apud L. Maclehose, in M. McKee (ed.), Health Care Systems in Transition: Republic of 
Moldova, European Observatory on Health Care Systems, vol. 4, no. 5, Copenhagen, 
2002, p. 7. 
73
  For an ethnographic description of the phenomenon of small informal cross-border traffic 
in Moldova and other CIS countries throughout the 1990-s, see, among others, Ruth 
Mandel, Caroline Humphrey (eds.) Markets and Moralities. Ethnographies of 
Postsocialism, Berg, Oxford/New York, 2002; Friederike Welter, David Smallbone, 
“Entrepreneurship in a Cross-Border Context: The Example of Transition Countries”, in 
53rd International Council for Small Business (ICSB) World Conference 2008: Advancing 
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Corruption is an informal compensatory practice, favoured by a context 
of pauperization and a drastic decrease of investments in public institutions, but 
it is also revealing of a cultural phenomenon (based on clientele relations and 
the trading of favours and gifts), which found fertile ground in the Moldovan 
context74. Corruption produces destructive effects on the economy, undermining 
the principle of fair competition, which, in its turn, weakens economic 
development75. Furthermore, the growing acceptance of a “culture” of 
corruption and fraud has also had negative effects on education, where informal 
practices (of corruption and plagiarism) have produced a parallel system of a 
hidden curriculum, which prepares individuals adapted to murky “transition” 
periods, rather than loyal citizens and fair contributors to general welfare76. 
The civil servants’ low competence and lack of motivation, and the 
state’s weakness in controlling the side-effects of the “transition” (i.e., massive 
pauperisation, corruption and the “state capture” by private interests) have 
created a flimsy foundation for the further development of a state based on the 
rule of law, a prosperous economy and an active civil society. 
In this context of massive pauperisation, general distrust in the state’s 
“democratic” institutions and an economic environment generating instability 
and inequalities, the coming to power of the Party of Communists after the early 
elections of February 2001 was facilitated by a protest vote, a generalized 
disappointment in existing power structures, as well as a “restorative 
nostalgia”77 for a political order of the past.  
 
 
The Years 2000: An Ambiguous Recovery 
  
On the background of an economic growth assisted by a favourable 
global and regional context, due to the framework of reforms elaborated and 
consolidated by the liberal governments between 1999-2000 and favoured by an 
increase in remittances and in the population’s consumption, the Moldovan 
economy rebounded after 2001 on an ascendant trajectory, until the 
                                                                                                                       
Small Business and Entrepreneurship: From Research to Results; 22-25 Jun. 2008, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, pp. 1-28. 
74
  See Corruption…cit. (particularly the studies of Lilian Negură, Ion Gumenâi and Virgil 
Pâslariuc). On corruption as a cultural phenomenon, see Elena Ledeneva, Russia’s 
Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
75
  Lilia Caraşciuc, “Corruption in Moldova…cit.”. 
76
  See Petru Negură, “Învățăm, învățăm și iarăși învățăm… a copia, a mitui și a fenta 
sistemul”, PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică socială, June 2014. URL: http://www.platzforma.md/ 
invatam-invatam-si-iarasi-invatam-a-copia-a-mitui-si-a-fenta-sistemul/, accessed on June 
25, 2016. 
77
  Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, Basic Books, 2001, see the “Introduction”.  
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international and regional economic crisis of 2007-200978. After a period of 
hesitation on fiscal policy and on the privatization of large enterprises, which in 
2002 caused an interruption in the financing of international organizations, the 
communist authorities continued, particularly after 2004, the program of the 
liberal reforms commenced in the previous periods. In 2004, Moldovan-Russian 
political relations grew colder, following President Voronin’s refusal to sign the 
Memorandum on the Federalization of the Republic of Moldova, proposed by 
the Russian official D. Kozak79. Meanwhile, in 2003, the EU launched its 
European Neighbourhood Policy (that provided, among others, for an increased 
assistance to the countries situated in the EU’s neighbourhood). In this context, 
the leadership of R. Moldova gradually restarted to co-operate with 
international financial institutions (IMF and IBRD) and officially declared the 
European integration as a state priority80. The fiscal policy was revised, in an 
international context of moderating liberal policies, and of increased attention 
from international institutions (IBRD, UN) to policies on reducing poverty, 
exclusion, inequality, and on promoting “social development” and “sustainable 
(environmental) development”81. R. Moldova joined this agreement in 2000. 
The programs developed by the governments of the Republic of Moldova 
during the years 2000, with the assistance of international institutions – The 
Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (SEGPR), launched in 
2004, the RM-EU Action Plan (2005), and later the National Strategy for 
Development (NSD) for 2008-2011 and the National Strategy for Development 
                                                 
78
  James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi, Krzysztof Krogulski & IMF Staff Team, 25 
Years of Transition Post-Communist Europe and the IMF, Regional Economic Issues 
Special Report, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014; Stuart Hensel, 
Anatol Gudim, “Moldova's Economic Transition: Slow and Contradictory”, in Ann Lewis 
(ed.), The EU & Moldova. On a Fault-line of Europe, Federal Trust. London, 2000. URL: 
http://www.cisr-md.org/pdf/Moldova-s%20Economic%20Transition.pdf, accessed on 
June 25, 2016; OECD, Development in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, OECD Publishing, 
2011. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264113039-en, accessed on June 25, 2016.  
79
  See Igor Boțan, “Efectele Planului Kozak”, e-democracy.md, 30 November 2013. URL: 
http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312031/, accessed on June 
25, 2016. 
80
  See the interview with Igor Boţan (for the project of documentary directed by Victor Ciobanu), 
23 April 2015 and, among other sources, Maia Sandu, “External Assistance”, cit. 
81
  “Globally, the need for connecting the external assistance to national priorities has been 
explicitly formulated only in early 2000, when, in response to accusations of imposing 
programs of reforms ‘from the outside’, the IMF and the World Bank have launched the 
initiative for countries to develop their own poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP).” 
Maia Sandu, “External Assistance”, cit., p. 316. This shift was also favoured by the 
UNDP-promoted concept of “social development”, based on ideas of Amartya Sen, and 
reflected in the Millennium Development Objectives Programme (UN Millennium 
Project), which Moldova joined in 2000. This programme aimed at reducing, amongst 
others, inequalities, exclusion and poverty, through the complete eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger. For details see http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/, accessed 
on June 25, 2016. 
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2020 – have all sought to create a favourable framework for an economic as 
well as social development. 
The relaunch of cooperation with international financial institutions in 
2004-2005 went hand-in-hand with an improvement of the business 
environment and investment climate82. However, corruption did not diminish 
during the years 2000. On the contrary, in 2005-2007 people perceived this 
phenomenon as being on the rise, based on an increase in the number of 
reported acts of corruption. By contrast with the increased number of registered 
cases of corruption, conviction rates were minimal83. Under the communist 
government, the process of “capturing” and “privatizing” the state by groups of 
private interest, which started in the 1990s, continued84. The following 
governments would continue to exploit this fault line in the state institutions, 
which was created and maintained throughout the 1990s and 2000s.   
 
 
Migration and/or Development? 
  
A significant contribution to the economic progress achieved by the 
Moldovan authorities in the years 2000 was made by the population of the 
Republic of Moldova – paradoxically, by leaving the country in search of work 
abroad. The money sent home by Moldovan labour migrants from Russia and 
Western Europe – the so-called remittances – have massively increased during 
the years 2000, reaching 30-35% of the GDP (in 2007, remittances surpassed 
several times the volume of foreign investments and foreign aid)85. Obviously, 
without these major contributions in the form of remittances, the economy of 
the Republic of Moldova would have had a much more difficult development 
(we should bear in mind that until 2007, Moldova and its people continued to 
pay back external debts accumulated in the 1990s). 
But labour migration inevitably had many side-effects: the de-
population of villages, the “haemorrhage” of staff and employees of all levels, a 
decrease in child-care and in assistance for the elderly, particularly in rural 
areas; moreover, labour migration involved the most active social segments of 
the Moldovan population, who had been practically deprived of employment in 
                                                 
82
  Valeriu Prohnițchii, “The Investment Climate: Challenges for the New Government”, in 
Government Priorities…cit., pp. 151-170. 
83
  “Throughout 2007, none of the persons convicted for crimes of corruption [152 out of 542 
registered cases] had been deprived of liberty. Moreover, some of those convicted had not 
been sanctioned with a deprivation of the right to occupy certain [administrative] posts”. 
Cristina Cojocaru, “The Anti-Corruption Efficiency, Ground by Formalism, Political 
Influence and Distrust”, in Government Priorities…cit., pp. 93-94.  
84
  Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton/New Jersey, 1996. 
85
  Maia Sandu, “External Assistance”, cit., p. 314.  
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Moldova in the context of the economic crisis from the end of the 1990s. On the 
one hand, remittances maintained currency levels that allowed the Moldovan 
economy to develop. On the other hand, this money flow, injected almost 
constantly in the economy of RM, somehow slowed down the economic 
development on the mid- and long-term, 1) because those who left the country 
were the ones who could have contributed to an economic and social 
development at home (by creating and implementing economic, social and 
cultural projects); 2) by making the Moldovan economy dependent on these 
external sources of finance, and by excessively favouring the services and 
consumption sectors, to the detriment of real production in industry, technology 
and agriculture; and 3) by encouraging decision-makers to relax as regards the 
economy (since this money flow ensured a sufficient level of currency to face 
an imminent economic crisis)86. 
 
 
The Stolen Revolution: 
An EU Integration on the Wrong Foot  
 
The Party of Communists’ announced yet contested victory in the 
parliamentary elections from April 2009 had mobilized a series of street 
demonstrations which degenerated on the 7th of April in violent clashes with the 
police and in the devastation of the Parliament building and the Presidency. The 
self-proclaimed “liberal” and “democratic” parties from the opposition 
successfully exploited these events, by disqualifying the way in which the 
communist government managed the protests on the 6-7th of April87. The early 
elections from June 2009 brought to power a coalition of self-proclaimed 
“democratic” parties that was welcomed by Western powers and international 
fora. The AEI-1 and AEI-2 governments came to power in a period of economic 
crisis that the previous communist governments had worsened by increasing the 
budget for public expenses88. The new “democratic” regime promoted a series 
                                                 
86
  See Alexandru Culiuc, “The Productive Use of Remittances. Perspectives for 
Moldova”, 4 February 2007 (Version 2.1) Memo (original version available at 
http://www.culiuc.com/papers/aculiuc_2006_sypa.pdf); Mateusz Walewski, Maia Sandu, 
Georgeta Mincu, Eugen Hristev, Beata Matzysiewicz, The Effects of Migration and 
Remittances in the Rural Areas of Moldova. Case Study on Managing Migration in 
Poland, Polish Aid, CASE – Centre for Social and Economic Investigations, 2008. 
87
  See the case file on the events of April 2009: Adrian Cibotaru (ed.), The Twitter 
Revolution. Episode One: Moldova, Ed. Arc, Chișinău, 2010.   
88
  “[...] the global public expenditures have risen constantly as a share of the GDP from 
30.3% in 2001 to 41.6% in 2008, as determined by the volume of resources accumulated 
by the state, without major changes in their structure or content.” Angela Casian, Anjela 
Baurciulu, “The Effects of the Budgetary-Fiscal Policy on the Management of Public 
Finances”, in Government Priorities…cit., pp. 132-133.  
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of economic reforms, and was assisted technically and financially by 
international financial institutions and donor countries, through an increase in 
foreign investments and remittances. The priorities set by international financial 
institutions included the privatization of Banca de Economii, of the airline 
services (including the airport) and of the railways of R. Moldova and 
Moldtelecom. The public budget plan provided for the reform of the pension 
system89. Taking advantage from an increased attention towards Moldova in the 
context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Vlad Filat 1st and 2nd 
governments (September 2009-May 2013) and that of Iurie Leancă (May 2013-
December 2014) convinced the European Union that R. Moldova is capable to 
continue political and economic reforms. On 27 June 2014, in Brussels, 
Moldovan and EU leaders signed the Association Agreement between the 
Republic of Moldova and the European Union, which also included the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between R. Moldova and the EU90. 
Moreover, in the same context, starting from 28 April 2014, the visa regime was 
liberalized for Moldovan citizens traveling to the Schengen zone91. 
However, political crises and tensions among various factions within 
the government cast a shadow on the economic growth registered in the 
beginning of the years 2010, and on the successes that had been achieved by the 
Filat and Leancă governments on the path to EU integration. The “Pădurea 
Domnească” case, where a businessman was killed by accident during a hunting 
party in a natural reservation that allows for no hunting at all, and which 
involved heads of top-level state institutions as well as businessmen92, revealed 
the advanced degree of convergence between state institutions and certain 
business circles. The broadcasting of some telephone conversations, that had 
been illegally wiretapped, of top party leaders with officials from ministries, 
courts and tax authorities, shed light on a mechanism, until then invisible, of 
interference and peddling in influence by certain party leaders in certain state 
institutions which, theoretically, should have enjoyed autonomy. Finally, the 
                                                 
89
  OECD Development in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, 2011.  
90
  See Deutche Welle, “The R. Moldova – EU Association Agreement Has Been Signed”. URL: 
http://www.dw.de/acordul-de-asociere-republica-moldova-ue-a-fost-semnat/a-17742325. 
See also Igor Boțan, The Provisions of the R. Moldova – EU Association Agreement. A 
Guide, Ed. Arc, Chișinău, 2014. The Guide is available at http://www.e-
democracy.md/files/ghid-acord-asociere-igor-botan.pdf, accessed on June 25, 2016. 
91
  This agreement was reached “by amending EU Regulation no. 539/2001 on abolishing visa 
requirements for short-stay travel to the Schengen area for nationals of R. Moldova holders of 
biometric passports”. See the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration of R. Moldova, “The Moldova-EU dialogue on visa liberalization”, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.md/liberalizarea-regimului-vize/, accessed on June 25, 2016. 
92
  See Iurie Sanduța, Victor Moșneag, “Vânătoarea de oameni în Pădurea Domnească”, 
Ziarul de Gardă, 10 January 2013, URL: http://www.zdg.md/editia-print/investigatii/ 
vanatoare-de-oameni-in-padurea-domneasca, accessed on July 1, 2016.  
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embezzlement from Banca de Economii, Banca Socială and Unibank banks of 
approximately one billion US dollars93, which presumably involved some top 
circles from the previous government (2009-2014) and the present one (in 2015-
2016), has shown the narrow limits of the rule of law and the critical level of the 
Moldovan state “being captured” by groups of private interests. Economic 
analysts and experts from the World Bank94 have forecasted for the following 
year an economic recession in the country, because of external factors (a 
decrease of exports in Russia, of investments and remittances) as well as 
internal ones (the banking “crisis” from R. Moldova). These non-transparent 
dealings have produced a state of frustration and increasing mistrust among the 
average population and the intellectual elite in the country. A recent opinion 
survey has shown that 85% of the respondents consider themselves poor. The 
same survey registers a growth of almost 20% of the respondents’ preferences 
related to the Republic of Moldova’s getting closer to the Customs Union (58%) 
when compared with those who wish for the EU integration (40%)95. Political 
expert Igor Boţan estimated, based on this survey, that “Those who governed 
the country and called themselves pro-European parties have made a disservice 
to the Republic of Moldova, in fact they undermined the European vector”96. In 
order to sustain the R. Moldova’s coming closer to the EU, it is necessary, 
points out another analyst, that the European and international institutions 
condition more firmly their financial support upon effective reforms being 
implemented in R. Moldovan, and not only the mimicking of reforms97. 
The coming to power of “democratic” parties in June 2009 has led to 
the appearance of some independent TV stations. This achievement of the new 
government has had, however, a reverse side: the lack of transparency as to the 
ownership of these stations. Persons who have lately concentrated political and 
economic power became owners of several TV stations in the country, as shown 
                                                 
93
  On this case, see the synthesis (references included) by Vitalie Sprânceană, “Căderea 
leului moldovenesc în 5 povești”, PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică socială, 20 February 
2015, URL: http://www.platzforma.md/caderea-leului-moldovenesc-in-5-povesti/, accessed on 
July 1, 2016. 
94
  Alexandru Fala, “Diagnoza și deprecierea leului moldovenesc”, Expert-Grup, 13 March 
2015, URL: http://www.expert-grup.org/ro/biblioteca/item/1090-studiu-mdl&category=7, 
accessed on?; Vlad Vasilcov, “Banca Mondială prognozează o recesiune a Republicii 
Moldova”, AGORA, 9 April 2015, URL: http://agora.md/stiri/7544/banca-mondiala-
prognozeaza-intrarea-in-recesiune-a-republicii-moldova, accessed on July 1, 2016. 
95
  IPP survey, April 2015. URL: http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=733 
&parent=0, accessed on July 1, 2016  
96
  Igor Boțan, “Eurointegrarea în pierdere de teren conform Barometrului Opiniei Publice”, 
Europa Liberă, 16 April 2015. URL: http://www.europalibera.org/content/ 
article/26961475.html, accessed on July 2, 2016.  
97
  Alexandr Voronovici, “Moldova’s Ambiguous European Integration”, in Open 
Democracy, 23 March 2015. URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexandr-
voronovici/moldova%27s-ambiguous-european-integration, accessed on May 2, 2015. 
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by some analyses98. This shows the risk of a possible increased interference, 
from the side of certain groups with political and economic influence, on the 
Moldovan media, and of “taming” the journalistic discourse to the tune of 
parties in power. In the last few years, the “democratic” governments have had 
several temptations to limit freedom of expression, through the closing down of 
the NIT TV station and, more recently, through the draft law proposed by the 
DP and LDPM which ostensibly aimed at eliminating foreign propaganda, but 
in fact represented an attempt to control the media space of R. Moldova99. 
 
 
An Amorphous and Divided Civil Society 
 
Despite the registration, after 1991, of a great number of non-
governmental organizations (over 8,200 in 2012), benefitting from considerable 
financial support, the Moldovan civil society still remains at the embryo stage 
and is hardly perceivable in the public space. One of the causes of this weakness 
is the exclusive financing from foreign sources100, which was actually the factor 
which made possible the appearance of this “civil society” in the first place. Part 
of the “fault” in this phenomenon can also be attributed to the Soviet 
inheritance, since in the USSR civic activism was controlled from the top. 
                                                 
98
  Doina Costin, Mamuka Andguladze, Transparence of the Ownership of Mass-Media...cit.; 
Vlada Ciobanu, “Mass Media in the Republic of Moldova: Pluralism Without Freedom” 
(part 1 and 2), PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică socială, September 2014, URL: 
http://www.platzforma.md/mass-media-din-republica-moldova-pluralism-fara-libertate/(1) 
and http://www.platzforma.md/mass-media-din-republica-moldova-pluralism-fara- libertate-
partea-2/. 
99
  Vitalie Călugăreanu, “Atac frontal asupra libertății de exprimare macat prin dorința de a 
opri propaganda rusească”, Deutsche Welle, 2 April 2015, URL: http://www.dw.de/atac-
frontal-%C3%AEmpotriva-libert%C4%83%C8%9Bii-de-exprimare-mascat-prin-dorin% 
C8%9Ba-de-a-opri-propaganda-ruseasc%C4%83/a-18359411, accessed on July 2, 2016. 
100
  Several studies show that the budget of non-governmental organizations is covered 
exclusively through grants obtained from foreign donor institutions (85-95%), less so 
through domestic revenues (contracted paid services: 6-13%), and even to a lower extent 
through public investments and local private donors (2-5%). By comparison, in Central 
European countries (Romania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), most 
financial resources of NGOs (approximately 43%) come from domestic income-
generating activities, including membership fees and paid services. In these countries, 
public sector support is a significant source of revenue, representing about 35%. These 
sources are further complemented by private philanthropy (22%), including fiscal breaks 
for private agents, individual fiscal benefits and voluntary contributions. USAID, 2010 
NGO Sustainability Index, 2011, p. 141, SDSC, 2012, p. 10. See also Petru Negură, 
“Suntem oare o societate bolnavă? Despre solidaritate, filantropie şi finanţarea 
ONG-urilor sociale în Republica Moldova”, PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică 
socială, 15 December 2013. URL: http://www.platzforma.md/sintem-oare-o-societate-
bolnava-despre-solidaritate-filantropie-si-finantarea-ong-urilor-sociale-in-republica-
moldova/, accessed on July 2, 2016.  
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Today, many NGOs have become a source of income and status, instead of 
representing authentic civic activism. This is also evidenced by the weak 
involvement of volunteers in the activity of the NGOs in the associative sector 
in Moldova101. On public matters, specialized NGOs adopt a standardized and 
stereotypical discourse, with little capacity to influence or effect change.  
The church is divided from a political (and geopolitical) point of view, 
and its public discourse is based exclusively on ideological and moral issues, 
without much consideration for major social problems (e.g. poverty and 
oppression). One fortunate exception which is worth mentioning in this context 
is the Social Mission “Diaconia” of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 
which from 2009 continues to expand its activity of providing social assistance 
to different groups of vulnerable persons102. 
For 25 years now, public intellectuals from R. Moldova have been 
engaged in the local public space in debates focused exclusively on symbolic 
and identity issues, thereby distracting public attention from topical social, 
political and economic matters. The case of the embezzlement from the three 
banks, recently publicized and intensely debated in the media space in Chişinău, 
has aroused the critical spirit of many Moldovan intellectuals and opinion 
makers. However, their public assemblies continue to be marked by speeches 
focusing on identity issues, with certain sectarian accents (e.g.: “Union...!” or 
“Down with the fifth column...!”), which represent claims that continue to 
fragment the cohesion and solidarity of the society of R. Moldova in the face of 
abuses committed by certain high-level officials.   
 
 
Why Have the Baltic States Seemingly Succeeded 
with the “Transition” Experiment?... 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, R. Moldova was often compared to 
the Baltic republic/states. Indeed, Moldova seemed to resemble these 
republics/states by more than a few criteria: surface area, size and ethnic 
composition of the population, geopolitical location, etc. However, the 
                                                 
101
  The Strategy for the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Moldova, 2012-
2015 (SDCS), Chișinău 2012. See also Nicolae Procopie, “Monitoring Report on the 
Implementation of Volunteer Activities as Part of General Objective 3 of the Action Plan 
of the Strategy on the Development of Civil Society (SDCS). 2012-2015”, Chișinău, 
2013. Petru Negură, “Suntem oare o societate bolnavă?...cit.”. 
102
  See the activity reports of the Social Mission “Diaconia” of the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia, on the website of the Mission, URL: http://www.diaconia.md/ pageview. 
php?l=ro&idc=307&t=/Despre-noi/Raport-de-activitate. See also the interview with 
Marco Povero, program coordinator at “The Mobile Social Canteen”, published on 
PLATZFORMA. Revista de critică socială, on 4 September 2015, URL: http://www.platzforma.md/ 
marco-povero-incercam-sa-nu-judecam-si-sa-oferim-ceea-ce-putem-oferi-un-prinz-cald-
si-sa-fim-aproape-de-aceste-persoane-cit-mai-mult-posibil/, accessed on July 2, 2016. 
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evolution of said countries during the 1990s and 2000s and their present-day 
status, as EU members since 2004, are completely different from the 
“transition” and the actual situation of the Republic of Moldova. The nominal 
per capita GDP in Latvia, for instance, was 10 times higher in 2014 than that of 
Moldova (RM: $2,232 vs. Latvia: $20,291). According to the Human 
Development Index, measured in 2014 (HDI – an index set by the UN to reflect 
the countries’ quality of life and human development potential), Latvia has an 
HDI of 0.810, and is listed among countries with a “very high” HDI (alongside 
Croatia and Argentina), while Moldova has an HDI of 0.663, ranking among 
countries with an “average” HDI (alongside countries such as Salvador and 
Bolivia)103. 
R. Moldova and the Baltic States have had a different starting point in 
the “transition race”. The Baltic States’ population and “elite” have shown a 
strong political will, manifested early on, for leaving the USSR and the 
Eurasian space. Local referenda organized in 1989 and 1990 conferred 
legitimacy to this political will. Since the declaration of independence and 
particularly after the failed putsch in Moscow in 1991, the Baltic States have 
enjoyed considerable political and economic support from the West (European 
countries, USA, international institutions, etc.).  
Estonia and Latvia in particular (and to a lesser extent Lithuania too) 
had been highly industrialized regions, with agriculture representing a minor 
share in the national income sources of these ex-Soviet republics (11-15%, 
compared to 35% in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova in 1992). 
Moreover, in 1991 these countries had currency and gold reserves, which had 
been deposited in foreign banks before these states’ annexation by the USSR in 
1940104. Following a decline in early 1990s, the economic development of the 
Baltic States has grown continuously after 2000 (except for periods of external 
crises). Beside the external financial and technical assistance received, the 
development of these countries was particularly aided by high-quality 
governance and by a systematic implementation of reforms which sought to 
enable the transition to a market economy. Corruption indexes and the state’s 
“capture” by vested interests have been decreasing since the mid-1990s, and this 
has had a positive impact on the business and investment climate105. 
In 1994, the last Russian troops left the Baltic States. This marked an 
official renunciation of geopolitical interest by Russia over these territories, 
which allowed for the Baltic States’ rapid economic and political 
                                                 
103
  See the ranking of countries by HDI, in 2014, by Wikipedia, URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index, accessed on July 3, 2016. 
104
  Ineta Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, p. 85. 
105
  See table no. 6.1, EBRD Transition Report 1999, p. 116. 
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disengagement from the Eurasian space and for a rapprochement with the West 
that culminated with their joining the EU in 2004. 
However, it is worth noting that many analysts consider that the 
neoliberal model adopted by the Baltic States has neglected, by comparison 
with the Visegrád states or Slovenia, among others, such aspects as the 
industrial development and social welfare (inclusion)106. Thereupon, we do 
not suggest that the Baltic States must be taken as a model of development 
for R. Moldova. This development model is yet to be considered and developed, 
and R. Moldova has at least the advantage, at this early stage of development, of 
being able to choose a viable development model, focused on economic 
development (agriculture, industry, services), as well as social development, 
which is key to ensuring the sustainability and social quality107 of any society. 
The examples of other countries (e.g. the Baltic States, the countries of the 
Visegrád group, or Slovenia) could perhaps suggest a model of development that is 
more suitable to the economic and social structure of the Republic of Moldova. 
 
 
…And Why Moldova Fails to Succeed? 
 
In the Republic of Moldova, by contrast with the Baltic States, the 
surveys carried out in 1990 and 1991 showed, on the contrary, that the majority 
of the population would have preferred to keep the republic within the USSR. 
The national and pro-independence movement, although enjoying massive 
support at the end of the 1980s, was rather ascribed to the pro-Romanian 
intellectual elite. The international support that R. Moldova benefitted from 
after 1991 was delayed and rather haphazard.  
Moldova’s economy was mainly agrarian, with a reduced industrial 
output (moreover, 28% of all industrial enterprises in R. Moldova were located 
in Transnistria). The loans offered by international financial institutions in 
1993-1997, had indebted R. Moldova for a decade ahead, without modernizing 
the infrastructure and the economy. The reforms aimed at facilitating the 
transition towards a liberal democracy and market economy, were operated in 
                                                 
106
  Dorothee Bohle, Bela Greskovits, “Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and 
Neocorporatism: Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe”, West 
European Politics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 443-466; Martin Wolf, “Why the Baltic States Are 
No model”, Financial Times, 30 April 2013, URL: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/090bd38e-
b0c7-11e2-80f9-00144feabdc0.htm, accessed on July 3, 2016; Fredrik Erixon, “Baltic 
Economic Reforms: A Crisis Review of Baltic Economic Policy”, ECIPE WORKING 
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1991-1998 reluctantly and with hesitations; these hesitations were 
understandable, since those who had to implement these reforms represented of 
the old-system elite, while the liberal reforms and especially the privatization 
were perceived as destroying the production model as well as, indirectly, the 
national economic heritage (since the property of industrial enterprises and 
agricultural collectives were embezzled on a large scale), without producing a 
viable economic system for the short and medium term. These government 
elites, composed mainly of Agrarian Party representatives, did not have enough 
competence, ability, or vision neither to efficiently and correctly manage the 
loans received from international financial institutions for an effective 
implementation of reforms, nor to negotiate with international financial 
institutions for more favourable terms for the loans and reforms.  
Finally, the conflict in Bender and Transnistria had a disastrous effect 
upon the economy on both banks of the Nistru River. This conflict, and the 
dislocation of Russian Federation troops on the territory of Transnistria (which 
de jure is the territory of R. Moldova), has marked Moldova as a potential 
conflict zone, positioned within Russia’s sphere of influence. In a period when 
the Baltic States, among others, focused on implementing reforms, the Republic of 
Moldova was wasting energy on war. The conflict on the Nistru River discouraged 
foreign investments for a long time. Nowadays however, 22 years after the 
settling of that conflict, the “scarecrow” which prevents foreign investments is the 
instability and the “captive” state on the right bank of the Nistru River. 
Since the geopolitical U-turn made by CPRM in 2004 by embracing the 
European vector, the investments from/and commercial relations with Western 
countries have increased constantly (overtaking those from Russia and CIS 
countries in 2006), as has the volume of financial and technical assistance from 
international financial institutions. However, the elites’ geopolitical hesitation 
and deficient governing practices, continued unabated. In 2015, the state R. 
Moldova reached a critical phase of becoming “captive” to vested interests. This 
geopolitical hesitation, indirectly coupled with the poor governance of the pro-
European elites, continue to undermine any project of sustainable modernisation 
and European integration.  
 
 
Epilogue 
 
A Western researcher qualified the Republic of Moldova in 2002 with 
the rather unflattering term of “pluralism by default” – in other words, an 
“involuntary pluralism”108. According to his analysis, pluralism – and not 
democracy, which was still inexistent – in the Republic of Moldova was a side 
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effect of the weakness of the state and its institutions, which were incapable of 
systematically promoting a program of modernization, and which were 
moreover “captured” by vested interests. Another reason for this “involuntary 
pluralism” is the division of the country’s elites along several identity 
discourses and geopolitical orientations. From the perspective of the author of 
this analysis, a viable democracy and a state based on the rule of law (just like 
an authoritarian regime, adds the author) requires a “powerful state”, that is a 
state whose institutions operate unaffected by vested interests and contextual 
geopolitical fluctuations.   
Continuing with this analysis, which remains perfectly valid in the 
moment of publication of this article, one can draw the conclusion that the 
failure of the “transition” in R. Moldova was caused to varying degrees by the 
following factors: 1) the weakness of state institutions that were captured by 
groups of vested interests; 2) a lack of resolve, and political and geopolitical 
oscillation of the ruling elites; 3) a deficient civil society, divided along cultural, 
identity and geopolitical lines, and thus unable to unite and push for a better and 
more honest governance. 
The solution to escaping from this crisis lies in breaking the cycle of 
this “pluralism by default” of the “transition”, by acting on the three above-
mentioned levels. Until a renewal of elites and a real reform of state institutions 
occur, this vicious cycle of under-development could be broken by the 
Moldovan society itself, by strengthening its internal cohesion and solidarity, 
beyond the – rather natural and potentially constructive – plurality of cultures 
and identities, political and geopolitical preferences, and by supporting an 
authentic activism, which would pressure the elites and decision-makers to 
working honestly, hand-in-hand with the governed, at building the foundation 
for a better common life and development.    
 
 
 
 
 
